Linux Sandbox: split the GPU policies to their own file.

content/common/sandbox_linux.h

Index: content/common/sandbox_linux.h
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_linux.h b/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5101f23df61298433d165bc84661dd8b23ba0442..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#ifndef CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
-#define CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
-
-#include <string>
-
-#include "base/basictypes.h"
-#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
-#include "content/public/common/sandbox_linux.h"
-
-template <typename T> struct DefaultSingletonTraits;
-namespace sandbox { class SetuidSandboxClient; }
-
-namespace content {
-
-// A singleton class to represent and change our sandboxing state for the
-// three main Linux sandboxes.
-class LinuxSandbox {
- public:
-  // This is a list of sandbox IPC methods which the renderer may send to the
-  // sandbox host. See http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC
-  // This isn't the full list, values < 32 are reserved for methods called from
-  // Skia.
-  enum LinuxSandboxIPCMethods {
-    METHOD_GET_FONT_FAMILY_FOR_CHAR = 32,
-    METHOD_LOCALTIME = 33,
-    METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE = 34,
-    METHOD_GET_STYLE_FOR_STRIKE = 35,
-    METHOD_MAKE_SHARED_MEMORY_SEGMENT = 36,
-    METHOD_MATCH_WITH_FALLBACK = 37,
-  };
-
-  // Get our singleton instance.
-  static LinuxSandbox* GetInstance();
-
-  // Do some initialization that can only be done before any of the sandboxes
-  // are enabled. If using the setuid sandbox, this should be called manually
-  // before the setuid sandbox is engaged.
-  void PreinitializeSandbox();
-
-  // Initialize the sandbox with the given pre-built configuration. Currently
-  // seccomp-bpf and address space limitations (the setuid sandbox works
-  // differently and is set-up in the Zygote). This will instantiate the
-  // LinuxSandbox singleton if it doesn't already exist.
-  static bool InitializeSandbox();
-
-  // Returns the Status of the renderers' sandbox. Can only be queried after
-  // going through PreinitializeSandbox(). This is a bitmask and uses the
-  // constants defined in "enum LinuxSandboxStatus". Since the status needs to
-  // be provided before the sandboxes are actually started, this returns what
-  // will actually happen once the various Start* functions are called from
-  // inside a renderer.
-  int GetStatus() const;
-  // Returns true if the current process is single-threaded or if the number
-  // of threads cannot be determined.
-  bool IsSingleThreaded() const;
-  // Did we start Seccomp BPF?
-  bool seccomp_bpf_started() const;
-
-  // Simple accessor for our instance of the setuid sandbox. Will never return
-  // NULL.
-  // There is no StartSetuidSandbox(), the SetuidSandboxClient instance should
-  // be used directly.
-  sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox_client() const;
-
-  // Check the policy and eventually start the seccomp-bpf sandbox. This should
-  // never be called with threads started. If we detect that threads have
-  // started we will crash.
-  bool StartSeccompBPF(const std::string& process_type);
-
-  // Limit the address space of the current process (and its children).
-  // to make some vulnerabilities harder to exploit.
-  bool LimitAddressSpace(const std::string& process_type);
-
- private:
-  friend struct DefaultSingletonTraits<LinuxSandbox>;
-
-  // We must have been pre_initialized_ before using this.
-  bool seccomp_bpf_supported() const;
-  // Returns true if it can be determined that the current process has open
-  // directories that are not managed by the LinuxSandbox class. This would
-  // be a vulnerability as it would allow to bypass the setuid sandbox.
-  bool HasOpenDirectories();
-  // The last part of the initialization is to make sure any temporary "hole"
-  // in the sandbox is closed. For now, this consists of closing proc_fd_.
-  void SealSandbox();
-
-  // A file descriptor to /proc. It's dangerous to have it around as it could
-  // allow for sandbox bypasses. It needs to be closed before we consider
-  // ourselves sandboxed.
-  int proc_fd_;
-  bool seccomp_bpf_started_;
-  // Did PreinitializeSandbox() run?
-  bool pre_initialized_;
-  bool seccomp_bpf_supported_;  // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
-  scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client_;
-
-  ~LinuxSandbox();
-  DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(LinuxSandbox);
-};
-
-}  // namespace content
-
-#endif  // CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
-