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1 // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSCALL_BROKER_BROKER_POLICY_H_ | |
6 #define SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSCALL_BROKER_BROKER_POLICY_H_ | |
7 | |
8 #include <string> | |
9 #include <vector> | |
10 | |
11 namespace sandbox { | |
12 namespace syscall_broker { | |
13 | |
14 class BrokerPolicy { | |
15 public: | |
16 BrokerPolicy(int denied_errno, | |
17 const std::vector<std::string>& allowed_r_files, | |
18 const std::vector<std::string>& allowed_w_files_); | |
19 ~BrokerPolicy(); | |
20 | |
21 // Check if calling access() should be allowed on |requested_filename| with | |
22 // mode |requested_mode|. | |
23 // Note: access() being a system call to check permissions, this can get a bit | |
24 // confusing. We're checking if calling access() should even be allowed with | |
25 // the same policy we would use for open(). | |
26 // If |file_to_access| is not NULL, we will return the matching pointer from | |
27 // the whitelist. For paranoia a caller should then use |file_to_access|. See | |
28 // GetFileNameIfAllowedToOpen() fore more explanation. | |
leecam
2014/10/31 21:06:25
for
jln (very slow on Chromium)
2014/10/31 21:43:19
Done.
| |
29 // return true if calling access() on this file should be allowed, false | |
30 // otherwise. | |
31 // Async signal safe if and only if |file_to_access| is NULL. | |
32 bool GetFileNameIfAllowedToAccess(const char* requested_filename, | |
33 int requested_mode, | |
34 const char** file_to_access) const; | |
35 | |
36 // Check if |requested_filename| can be opened with flags |requested_flags|. | |
37 // If |file_to_open| is not NULL, we will return the matching pointer from the | |
38 // whitelist. For paranoia, a caller should then use |file_to_open| rather | |
39 // than |requested_filename|, so that it never attempts to open an | |
40 // attacker-controlled file name, even if an attacker managed to fool the | |
41 // string comparison mechanism. | |
42 // Return true if opening should be allowed, false otherwise. | |
43 // Async signal safe if and only if |file_to_open| is NULL. | |
44 bool GetFileNameIfAllowedToOpen(const char* requested_filename, | |
45 int requested_flags, | |
46 const char** file_to_open) const; | |
47 int denied_errno() const { return denied_errno_; } | |
48 | |
49 private: | |
50 const int denied_errno_; | |
51 const std::vector<std::string> allowed_r_files_; | |
52 const std::vector<std::string> allowed_w_files_; | |
53 }; | |
54 | |
55 } // namespace syscall_broker | |
56 | |
57 } // namespace sandbox | |
58 | |
59 #endif // SANDBOX_LINUX_SYSCALL_BROKER_BROKER_POLICY_H_ | |
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