Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
index 32fe2a7d7480ca960021f9bff24b6c6c5e956a90..1a9ce43b920932ea51c96500f3f456cb665680ea 100644 |
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h |
@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SandboxBPF { |
// provided by the caller. |
static SandboxStatus SupportsSeccompSandbox(int proc_fd); |
+ // Determines if the kernel has support for the seccomp() system call to |
+ // synchronize BPF filters across a thread group. |
+ static SandboxStatus SupportsSeccompThreadFilterSynchronization(); |
jln (very slow on Chromium)
2014/08/20 21:34:20
I think I would rather have this and SupportsSecco
Robert Sesek
2014/08/21 16:50:18
I agree that SupportsSeccompSandbox should do this
|
+ |
// The sandbox needs to be able to access files in "/proc/self". If this |
// directory is not accessible when "startSandbox()" gets called, the caller |
// can provide an already opened file descriptor by calling "set_proc_fd()". |