Add domain-specific language for BPF policies

sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl_unittest.cc

+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/bpf_dsl.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+
+#include "base/macros.h"
+#include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/errorcode.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h"
+
+using namespace sandbox::bpf_dsl;
+
+// Helper macro to assert that expression |expr| returns -1 and sets
+// errno to |err|.
+#define BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(err, expr) \
+  do {                              \
+    errno = 0;                      \
+    BPF_ASSERT_EQ(-1, expr);        \
+    BPF_ASSERT_EQ(err, errno);      \
+  } while (0)
+
+namespace sandbox {
+namespace {
+
+class BasicPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  BasicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~BasicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_getpgid) {
+      const Arg<pid_t> pid(0);
+      return If(pid == 0, Error(EPERM)).Else(Error(EINVAL));
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BasicPolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, Basic, BasicPolicy) {
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, getpgid(0));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, getpgid(1));
+}
+
+/* On IA-32, socketpair() is implemented via socketcall(). :-( */
+#if !defined(ARCH_CPU_X86)
+class BooleanLogicPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  BooleanLogicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~BooleanLogicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_socketpair) {
+      const Arg<int> domain(0), type(1), protocol(2);
+      return If(domain == AF_UNIX &&
+                    (type == SOCK_STREAM || type == SOCK_DGRAM) &&
+                    protocol == 0,
+                Error(EPERM)).Else(Error(EINVAL));
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BooleanLogicPolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, BooleanLogic, BooleanLogicPolicy) {
+  int sv[2];
+
+  // Acceptable combinations that should return EPERM.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sv));
+
+  // Combinations that are invalid for only one reason; should return EINVAL.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sv));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, sv));
+
+  // Completely unacceptable combination; should also return EINVAL.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL,
+                   socketpair(AF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_UDP, sv));
+}
+#endif  // !ARCH_CPU_X86
+
+class MoreBooleanLogicPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  MoreBooleanLogicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~MoreBooleanLogicPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_setresuid) {
+      const Arg<uid_t> ruid(0), euid(1), suid(2);
+      return If(ruid == 0 || euid == 0 || suid == 0, Error(EPERM))
+          .ElseIf(ruid == 1 && euid == 1 && suid == 1, Error(EAGAIN))
+          .Else(Error(EINVAL));
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MoreBooleanLogicPolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, MoreBooleanLogic, MoreBooleanLogicPolicy) {
+  // Expect EPERM if any set to 0.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, setresuid(0, 5, 5));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, setresuid(5, 0, 5));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, setresuid(5, 5, 0));
+
+  // Expect EAGAIN if all set to 1.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EAGAIN, setresuid(1, 1, 1));
+
+  // Expect EINVAL for anything else.
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setresuid(5, 1, 1));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setresuid(1, 5, 1));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setresuid(1, 1, 5));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setresuid(3, 4, 5));
+}
+
+static const uintptr_t kDeadBeefAddr =
+    static_cast<uintptr_t>(0xdeadbeefdeadbeefULL);
+
+class ArgSizePolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  ArgSizePolicy() {}
+  virtual ~ArgSizePolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_uname) {
+      const Arg<uintptr_t> addr(0);
+      return If(addr == kDeadBeefAddr, Error(EPERM)).Else(Allow());
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ArgSizePolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, ArgSizeTest, ArgSizePolicy) {
+  struct utsname buf;
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, uname(&buf));
+
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM,
+                   uname(reinterpret_cast<struct utsname*>(kDeadBeefAddr)));
+}
+
+class TrappingPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  TrappingPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~TrappingPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_uname) {
+      return Trap(UnameTrap, &count_);
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  static intptr_t count_;
+
+  static intptr_t UnameTrap(const struct arch_seccomp_data& data, void* aux) {
+    BPF_ASSERT_EQ(&count_, aux);
+    return ++count_;
+  }
+
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(TrappingPolicy);
+};
+
+intptr_t TrappingPolicy::count_;
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, TrapTest, TrappingPolicy) {
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(1, uname(NULL));
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(2, uname(NULL));
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(3, uname(NULL));
+}
+
+class MaskingPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  MaskingPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~MaskingPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_setuid) {
+      const Arg<uid_t> uid(0);
+      return If((uid & 0xf) == 0, Error(EINVAL)).Else(Error(EACCES));
+    }
+    if (sysno == __NR_setgid) {
+      const Arg<gid_t> gid(0);
+      return If((gid & 0xf0) == 0xf0, Error(EINVAL)).Else(Error(EACCES));
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MaskingPolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, MaskTest, MaskingPolicy) {
+  for (uid_t uid = 0; uid < 0x100; ++uid) {
+    const int expect_errno = (uid & 0xf) == 0 ? EINVAL : EACCES;
+    BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(expect_errno, setuid(uid));
+  }
+
+  for (gid_t gid = 0; gid < 0x100; ++gid) {
+    const int expect_errno = (gid & 0xf0) == 0xf0 ? EINVAL : EACCES;
+    BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(expect_errno, setgid(gid));
+  }
+}
+
+class ElseIfPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy {
+ public:
+  ElseIfPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~ElseIfPolicy() {}
+  virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE {
+    if (sysno == __NR_setuid) {
+      const Arg<uid_t> uid(0);
+      return If((uid & 0xfff) == 0, Error(0))
+          .ElseIf((uid & 0xff0) == 0, Error(EINVAL))
+          .ElseIf((uid & 0xf00) == 0, Error(EEXIST))
+          .Else(Error(EACCES));
+    }
+    return Allow();
+  }
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ElseIfPolicy);
+};
+
+BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, ElseIfTest, ElseIfPolicy) {
+  BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, setuid(0));
+
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setuid(0x0001));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setuid(0x0002));
+
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EEXIST, setuid(0x0011));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EEXIST, setuid(0x0022));
+
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EACCES, setuid(0x0111));
+  BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EACCES, setuid(0x0222));
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+}  // namespace sandbox