| Index: content/common/media/media_stream_messages.h
|
| diff --git a/content/common/media/media_stream_messages.h b/content/common/media/media_stream_messages.h
|
| index d4847c214644679e3894dc00a2c978873920220c..160c820844ee0317b2d44163eb6a659bba81ccd9 100644
|
| --- a/content/common/media/media_stream_messages.h
|
| +++ b/content/common/media/media_stream_messages.h
|
| @@ -152,3 +152,15 @@ IPC_MESSAGE_CONTROL2(MediaStreamHostMsg_SubscribeToDeviceChangeNotifications,
|
| // Cancel notifications about changes in the set of media devices.
|
| IPC_MESSAGE_CONTROL1(MediaStreamHostMsg_CancelDeviceChangeNotifications,
|
| int /* render frame id */)
|
| +
|
| +// Tell the browser process if the video capture is secure (i.e., all
|
| +// connected video sinks meet the requirement of output protection.).
|
| +// Note: the browser process only trusts the |is_sucure| value in this IPC
|
| +// message if it's comimg from a trusted, whitelisted extension. Extensions run
|
| +// in separate render processes. So it shouldn't be possible, for example, for
|
| +// a user's visit to a malicious web page to compromise a render process running
|
| +// a trusted extension to make it report falsehood in this IPC message.
|
| +IPC_MESSAGE_CONTROL3(MediaStreamHostMsg_SetCapturingLinkSecured,
|
| + int, /* session_id */
|
| + content::MediaStreamType, /* type */
|
| + bool /* is_secure */)
|
|
|