Index: google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol_nss.cc |
=================================================================== |
--- google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol_nss.cc (revision 0) |
+++ google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol_nss.cc (revision 0) |
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ |
+// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
+// found in the LICENSE file. |
+ |
+#include "google_apis/cup/client_update_protocol.h" |
+ |
+#include <keyhi.h> |
+#include <pk11pub.h> |
+#include <seccomon.h> |
+ |
+#include "base/logging.h" |
+#include "crypto/nss_util.h" |
+#include "crypto/scoped_nss_types.h" |
+ |
+typedef scoped_ptr_malloc< |
+ CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo, |
+ crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo, |
+ SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo> > |
+ ScopedCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo; |
+ |
+ClientUpdateProtocol::~ClientUpdateProtocol() { |
+ if (public_key_) |
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(public_key_); |
+} |
+ |
+bool ClientUpdateProtocol::LoadPublicKey(const base::StringPiece& public_key) { |
+ crypto::EnsureNSSInit(); |
+ |
+ // The binary blob |public_key| is expected to be a DER-encoded ASN.1 |
+ // Subject Public Key Info. |
+ SECItem spki_item; |
+ spki_item.type = siBuffer; |
+ spki_item.data = |
+ reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(const_cast<char*>(public_key.data())); |
+ spki_item.len = static_cast<unsigned int>(public_key.size()); |
+ |
+ ScopedCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki( |
+ SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki_item)); |
+ if (!spki.get()) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ public_key_ = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki.get()); |
+ if (!public_key_) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ if (!PublicKeyLength()) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ return true; |
+} |
+ |
+size_t ClientUpdateProtocol::PublicKeyLength() { |
+ if (!public_key_) |
+ return 0; |
+ |
+ return SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(public_key_); |
+} |
+ |
+bool ClientUpdateProtocol::EncryptKeySource( |
+ const std::vector<uint8>& key_source) { |
+ // WARNING: This call bypasses the usual PKCS #1 padding and does direct RSA |
+ // exponentiation. This is not secure without taking measures to ensure that |
+ // the contents of r are suitable. This is done to remain compatible with |
+ // the implementation on the Google Update servers; don't copy-paste this |
+ // code arbitrarily and expect it to work and/or remain secure! |
+ if (!public_key_) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ size_t keysize = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(public_key_); |
+ if (key_source.size() != keysize) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ encrypted_key_source_.resize(keysize); |
+ return SECSuccess == PK11_PubEncryptRaw( |
+ public_key_, |
+ &encrypted_key_source_[0], |
+ const_cast<unsigned char*>(&key_source[0]), |
+ key_source.size(), |
+ NULL); |
+} |
+ |