SECCOMP-BPF: Refactor the BPF sandbox API to use fewer "static" fields and methods.

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__
 #define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__
 
-#include <endian.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-// #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/filter.h>
-// #include <linux/seccomp.h>
-#include <linux/unistd.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/tcp.h>
-#include <netinet/udp.h>
-#include <sched.h>
-#include <signal.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/ipc.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <limits>
 #include <map>
 #include <set>
 #include <utility>
 #include <vector>
 
-#if !defined(SECCOMP_BPF_STANDALONE)
-#include "base/basictypes.h"
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
-#endif
-
-
-// The Seccomp2 kernel ABI is not part of older versions of glibc.
-// As we can't break compilation with these versions of the library,
-// we explicitly define all missing symbols.
-
-// For audit.h
-#ifndef EM_ARM
-#define EM_ARM    40
-#endif
-#ifndef EM_386
-#define EM_386    3
-#endif
-#ifndef EM_X86_64
-#define EM_X86_64 62
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT
-#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
-#endif
-#ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_LE
-#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE    0x40000000
-#endif
-#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
-#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARM    (EM_ARM|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
-#endif
-#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_I386
-#define AUDIT_ARCH_I386   (EM_386|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
-#endif
-#ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
-#define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
-#endif
-
-// For prctl.h
-#ifndef PR_SET_SECCOMP
-#define PR_SET_SECCOMP               22
-#define PR_GET_SECCOMP               21
-#endif
-#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
-#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS          38
-#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS          39
-#endif
-#ifndef IPC_64
-#define IPC_64                   0x0100
-#endif
-
-#ifndef BPF_MOD
-#define BPF_MOD                    0x90
-#endif
-#ifndef BPF_XOR
-#define BPF_XOR                    0xA0
-#endif
-
-// In order to build will older tool chains, we currently have to avoid
-// including <linux/seccomp.h>. Until that can be fixed (if ever). Rely on
-// our own definitions of the seccomp kernel ABI.
-#ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED         0
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT           1
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER           2  // User user-supplied filter
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL
-// Return values supported for BPF filter programs. Please note that the
-// "illegal" SECCOMP_RET_INVALID is not supported by the kernel, should only
-// ever be used internally, and would result in the kernel killing our process.
-#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL    0x00000000U  // Kill the task immediately
-#define SECCOMP_RET_INVALID 0x00010000U  // Illegal return value
-#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP    0x00030000U  // Disallow and force a SIGSYS
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO   0x00050000U  // Returns an errno
-#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE   0x7ff00000U  // Pass to a tracer or disallow
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW   0x7fff0000U  // Allow
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION  0xffff0000U  // Masks for the return value
-#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA    0x0000ffffU  //   sections
-#else
-#define SECCOMP_RET_INVALID 0x00010000U  // Illegal return value
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP
-#define SYS_SECCOMP                   1
-#endif
-
-// Impose some reasonable maximum BPF program size. Realistically, the
-// kernel probably has much lower limits. But by limiting to less than
-// 30 bits, we can ease requirements on some of our data types.
-#define SECCOMP_MAX_PROGRAM_SIZE (1<<30)
-
-#if defined(__i386__)
-#define MIN_SYSCALL         0u
-#define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL  1024u
-#define MAX_SYSCALL         MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH        AUDIT_ARCH_I386
-
-#define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.gregs[(_reg)])
-#define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx)    SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EAX)
-#define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx)   SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EAX)
-#define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx)        SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EIP)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EBX)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_ECX)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EDX)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_ESI)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EDI)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EBP)
-#define SECCOMP_NR_IDX          (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr))
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX        (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch))
-#define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 0)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 0)
-
-#elif defined(__x86_64__)
-#define MIN_SYSCALL         0u
-#define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL  1024u
-#define MAX_SYSCALL         MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH        AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
-
-#define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.gregs[(_reg)])
-#define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx)    SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RAX)
-#define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx)   SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RAX)
-#define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx)        SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RIP)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RDI)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RSI)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RDX)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R10)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R8)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R9)
-#define SECCOMP_NR_IDX          (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr))
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX        (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch))
-#define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 0)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 0)
-
-#elif defined(__arm__) && (defined(__thumb__) || defined(__ARM_EABI__))
-// ARM EABI includes "ARM private" system calls starting at |__ARM_NR_BASE|,
-// and a "ghost syscall private to the kernel", cmpxchg,
-// at |__ARM_NR_BASE+0x00fff0|.
-// See </arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h> in the Linux kernel.
-#define MIN_SYSCALL         ((unsigned int)__NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
-#define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL  (MIN_SYSCALL + 1024u)
-#define MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL ((unsigned int)__ARM_NR_BASE)
-#define MAX_PRIVATE_SYSCALL (MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL + 16u)
-#define MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL   ((unsigned int)__ARM_NR_BASE + 0xfff0u)
-#define MAX_SYSCALL         (MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL + 4u)
-
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
-
-// ARM sigcontext_t is different from i386/x86_64.
-// See </arch/arm/include/asm/sigcontext.h> in the Linux kernel.
-#define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.arm_##_reg)
-// ARM EABI syscall convention.
-#define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx)    SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r0)
-#define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx)   SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r7)
-#define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx)        SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, pc)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r0)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r1)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r2)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r3)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r4)
-#define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx)     SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r5)
-#define SECCOMP_NR_IDX          (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr))
-#define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX        (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch))
-#define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX      (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data,           \
-                                          instruction_pointer) + 0)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 4)
-#define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) +   \
-                                 8*(nr) + 0)
-
-#else
-#error Unsupported target platform
-
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_STANDALONE)
-#define arraysize(x) (sizeof(x)/sizeof(*(x)))
-#define HANDLE_EINTR TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY
-#define DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(TypeName) \
-  TypeName();                                    \
-  TypeName(const TypeName&);                     \
-  void operator=(const TypeName&)
-
-template <bool>
-struct CompileAssert {
-};
-#define COMPILE_ASSERT(expr, msg) \
-  typedef CompileAssert<(bool(expr))> msg[bool(expr) ? 1 : -1]
-#endif
-
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/die.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/errorcode.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/port.h"
+
 
 namespace playground2 {
 
 struct arch_seccomp_data {
   int      nr;
   uint32_t arch;
   uint64_t instruction_pointer;
   uint64_t args[6];
 };
 
@@ skipping 15 matching lines @@
     STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,  // Currently unavailable but might work again later
     STATUS_AVAILABLE,    // Sandboxing is available but not currently active
     STATUS_ENABLED       // The sandbox is now active
   };
 
   // When calling setSandboxPolicy(), the caller can provide an arbitrary
   // pointer. This pointer will then be forwarded to the sandbox policy
   // each time a call is made through an EvaluateSyscall function pointer.
   // One common use case would be to pass the "aux" pointer as an argument
   // to Trap() functions.
-  typedef ErrorCode (*EvaluateSyscall)(int sysnum, void *aux);
+  typedef ErrorCode (*EvaluateSyscall)(Sandbox *sb, int sysnum, void *aux);
   typedef std::vector<std::pair<EvaluateSyscall, void *> >Evaluators;
 
   // A vector of BPF instructions that need to be installed as a filter
   // program in the kernel.
   typedef std::vector<struct sock_filter> Program;
 
+  // Constructors and destructors.
+  Sandbox();
+  ~Sandbox();
+
   // Checks whether a particular system call number is valid on the current
   // architecture. E.g. on ARM there's a non-contiguous range of private
   // system calls.
   static bool IsValidSyscallNumber(int sysnum);
 
   // There are a lot of reasons why the Seccomp sandbox might not be available.
   // This could be because the kernel does not support Seccomp mode, or it
   // could be because another sandbox is already active.
   // "proc_fd" should be a file descriptor for "/proc", or -1 if not
   // provided by the caller.
   static SandboxStatus SupportsSeccompSandbox(int proc_fd);
 
   // The sandbox needs to be able to access files in "/proc/self". If this
   // directory is not accessible when "startSandbox()" gets called, the caller
   // can provide an already opened file descriptor by calling "set_proc_fd()".
   // The sandbox becomes the new owner of this file descriptor and will
-  // eventually close it when "startSandbox()" executes.
-  static void set_proc_fd(int proc_fd);
+  // eventually close it when "StartSandbox()" executes.
+  void set_proc_fd(int proc_fd);
 
   // The system call evaluator function is called with the system
   // call number. It can decide to allow the system call unconditionally
   // by returning ERR_ALLOWED; it can deny the system call unconditionally by
   // returning an appropriate "errno" value; or it can request inspection
   // of system call argument(s) by returning a suitable ErrorCode.
   // The "aux" parameter can be used to pass optional data to the system call
   // evaluator. There are different possible uses for this data, but one of the
   // use cases would be for the policy to then forward this pointer to a Trap()
   // handler. In this case, of course, the data that is pointed to must remain
   // valid for the entire time that Trap() handlers can be called; typically,
   // this would be the lifetime of the program.
-  static void SetSandboxPolicy(EvaluateSyscall syscallEvaluator, void *aux);
+  void SetSandboxPolicy(EvaluateSyscall syscallEvaluator, void *aux);
 
   // We can use ErrorCode to request calling of a trap handler. This method
   // performs the required wrapping of the callback function into an
   // ErrorCode object.
   // The "aux" field can carry a pointer to arbitrary data. See EvaluateSyscall
-  // for a description of how to pass data from setSandboxPolicy() to a Trap()
+  // for a description of how to pass data from SetSandboxPolicy() to a Trap()
   // handler.
-  static ErrorCode Trap(Trap::TrapFnc fnc, const void *aux);
+  ErrorCode Trap(Trap::TrapFnc fnc, const void *aux);
 
   // Calls a user-space trap handler and disables all sandboxing for system
   // calls made from this trap handler.
   // This feature is available only if explicitly enabled by the user having
   // set the CHROME_SANDBOX_DEBUGGING environment variable.
   // Returns an ET_INVALID ErrorCode, if called when not enabled.
   // NOTE: This feature, by definition, disables all security features of
   //   the sandbox. It should never be used in production, but it can be
   //   very useful to diagnose code that is incompatible with the sandbox.
   //   If even a single system call returns "UnsafeTrap", the security of
   //   entire sandbox should be considered compromised.
-  static ErrorCode UnsafeTrap(Trap::TrapFnc fnc, const void *aux);
+  ErrorCode UnsafeTrap(Trap::TrapFnc fnc, const void *aux);
 
   // From within an UnsafeTrap() it is often useful to be able to execute
   // the system call that triggered the trap. The ForwardSyscall() method
   // makes this easy. It is more efficient than calling glibc's syscall()
   // function, as it avoid the extra round-trip to the signal handler. And
   // it automatically does the correct thing to report kernel-style error
   // conditions, rather than setting errno. See the comments for TrapFnc for
   // details. In other words, the return value from ForwardSyscall() is
   // directly suitable as a return value for a trap handler.
   static intptr_t ForwardSyscall(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args);
 
   // We can also use ErrorCode to request evaluation of a conditional
   // statement based on inspection of system call parameters.
   // This method wrap an ErrorCode object around the conditional statement.
   // Argument "argno" (1..6) will be compared to "value" using comparator
   // "op". If the condition is true "passed" will be returned, otherwise
   // "failed".
   // If "is32bit" is set, the argument must in the range of 0x0..(1u << 32 - 1)
   // If it is outside this range, the sandbox treats the system call just
   // the same as any other ABI violation (i.e. it aborts with an error
   // message).
-  static ErrorCode Cond(int argno, ErrorCode::ArgType is_32bit,
-                        ErrorCode::Operation op,
-                        uint64_t value, const ErrorCode& passed,
-                        const ErrorCode& failed);
+  ErrorCode Cond(int argno, ErrorCode::ArgType is_32bit,
+                 ErrorCode::Operation op,
+                 uint64_t value, const ErrorCode& passed,
+                 const ErrorCode& failed);
 
   // Kill the program and print an error message.
-  static ErrorCode Kill(const char *msg);
+  ErrorCode Kill(const char *msg);
 
   // This is the main public entry point. It finds all system calls that
   // need rewriting, sets up the resources needed by the sandbox, and
   // enters Seccomp mode.
-  static void StartSandbox() { StartSandboxInternal(false); }
+  // It is possible to stack multiple sandboxes by creating separate "Sandbox"
+  // objects and calling "StartSandbox()" on each of them. Please note, that
+  // this requires special care, though, as newly stacked sandboxes can never
+  // relax restrictions imposed by earlier sandboxes. Furthermore, installing
+  // a new policy requires making system calls, that might already be
+  // disallowed.
+  // Finally, stacking does add more kernel overhead than having a single
+  // combined policy. So, it should only be used if there are no alternatives.
+  void StartSandbox();
 
   // Assembles a BPF filter program from the current policy. After calling this
   // function, you must not call any other sandboxing function.
   // Typically, AssembleFilter() is only used by unit tests and by sandbox
   // internals. It should not be used by production code.
   // For performance reasons, we normally only run the assembled BPF program
   // through the verifier, iff the program was built in debug mode.
   // But by setting "force_verification", the caller can request that the
   // verifier is run unconditionally. This is useful for unittests.
-  static Program *AssembleFilter(bool force_verification);
+  Program *AssembleFilter(bool force_verification);
+
+  // Returns the fatal ErrorCode that is used to indicate that somebody
+  // attempted to pass a 64bit value in a 32bit system call argument.
+  // This method is primarily needed for testing purposes.
+  ErrorCode Unexpected64bitArgument();
 
  private:
   friend class CodeGen;
   friend class SandboxUnittestHelper;
   friend class ErrorCode;
-  friend class Util;
-  friend class Verifier;
 
   struct Range {
     Range(uint32_t f, uint32_t t, const ErrorCode& e)
         : from(f),
           to(t),
           err(e) {
     }
     uint32_t  from, to;
     ErrorCode err;
   };
   typedef std::vector<Range> Ranges;
   typedef std::map<uint32_t, ErrorCode> ErrMap;
   typedef std::set<ErrorCode, struct ErrorCode::LessThan> Conds;
 
   // Get a file descriptor pointing to "/proc", if currently available.
-  static int proc_fd() { return proc_fd_; }
+  int proc_fd() { return proc_fd_; }
 
-  static ErrorCode ProbeEvaluator(int sysnum, void *) __attribute__((const));
-  static void      ProbeProcess(void);
-  static ErrorCode AllowAllEvaluator(int sysnum, void *aux);
-  static void      TryVsyscallProcess(void);
-  static bool      KernelSupportSeccompBPF(int proc_fd);
-  static bool      RunFunctionInPolicy(void (*function)(),
-                                       EvaluateSyscall syscall_evaluator,
-                                       void *aux,
-                                       int proc_fd);
-  static void      StartSandboxInternal(bool quiet);
-  static bool      IsSingleThreaded(int proc_fd);
-  static bool      IsDenied(const ErrorCode& code);
-  static bool      DisableFilesystem();
-  static void      PolicySanityChecks(EvaluateSyscall syscall_evaluator,
-                                      void *aux);
+  // Creates a subprocess and runs "code_in_sandbox" inside of the specified
+  // policy. The caller has to make sure that "this" has not yet been
+  // initialized with any other policies.
+  bool RunFunctionInPolicy(void (*code_in_sandbox)(),
+                           EvaluateSyscall syscall_evaluator, void *aux);
 
-  // Function that can be passed as a callback function to CodeGen::Traverse().
-  // Checks whether the "insn" returns an UnsafeTrap() ErrorCode. If so, it
-  // sets the "bool" variable pointed to by "aux".
-  static void      CheckForUnsafeErrorCodes(Instruction *insn, void *aux);
+  // Performs a couple of sanity checks to verify that the kernel supports the
+  // features that we need for successful sandboxing.
+  // The caller has to make sure that "this" has not yet been initialized with
+  // any other policies.
+  bool KernelSupportSeccompBPF();
 
-  // Function that can be passed as a callback function to CodeGen::Traverse().
-  // Checks whether the "insn" returns an errno value from a BPF filter. If so,
-  // it rewrites the instruction to instead call a Trap() handler that does
-  // the same thing. "aux" is ignored.
-  static void      RedirectToUserspace(Instruction *insn, void *aux);
-
-  // Stackable wrapper around an Evaluators handler. Changes ErrorCodes
-  // returned by a system call evaluator to match the changes made by
-  // RedirectToUserspace(). "aux" should be pointer to wrapped system call
-  // evaluator.
-  static ErrorCode RedirectToUserspaceEvalWrapper(int sysnum, void *aux);
+  // Verify that the current policy passes some basic sanity checks.
+  void PolicySanityChecks(EvaluateSyscall syscall_evaluator, void *aux);
 
   // Assembles and installs a filter based on the policy that has previously
   // been configured with SetSandboxPolicy().
-  static void      InstallFilter(bool quiet);
+  void InstallFilter();
 
   // Verify the correctness of a compiled program by comparing it against the
   // current policy. This function should only ever be called by unit tests and
   // by the sandbox internals. It should not be used by production code.
-  static void VerifyProgram(const Program& program, bool has_unsafe_traps);
+  void VerifyProgram(const Program& program, bool has_unsafe_traps);
 
   // Finds all the ranges of system calls that need to be handled. Ranges are
   // sorted in ascending order of system call numbers. There are no gaps in the
   // ranges. System calls with identical ErrorCodes are coalesced into a single
   // range.
-  static void      FindRanges(Ranges *ranges);
+  void FindRanges(Ranges *ranges);
 
   // Returns a BPF program snippet that implements a jump table for the
   // given range of system call numbers. This function runs recursively.
-  static Instruction *AssembleJumpTable(CodeGen *gen,
-                                        Ranges::const_iterator start,
-                                        Ranges::const_iterator stop);
+  Instruction *AssembleJumpTable(CodeGen *gen,
+                                 Ranges::const_iterator start,
+                                 Ranges::const_iterator stop);
 
   // Returns a BPF program snippet that makes the BPF filter program exit
   // with the given ErrorCode "err". N.B. the ErrorCode may very well be a
   // conditional expression; if so, this function will recursively call
   // CondExpression() and possibly RetExpression() to build a complex set of
   // instructions.
-  static Instruction *RetExpression(CodeGen *gen, const ErrorCode& err);
+  Instruction *RetExpression(CodeGen *gen, const ErrorCode& err);
 
   // Returns a BPF program that evaluates the conditional expression in
   // "cond" and returns the appropriate value from the BPF filter program.
   // This function recursively calls RetExpression(); it should only ever be
   // called from RetExpression().
-  static Instruction *CondExpression(CodeGen *gen, const ErrorCode& cond);
-
-  // Returns the fatal ErrorCode that is used to indicate that somebody
-  // attempted to pass a 64bit value in a 32bit system call argument.
-  static ErrorCode Unexpected64bitArgument();
-
-  // A Trap() handler that returns an "errno" value. The value is encoded
-  // in the "aux" parameter.
-  static intptr_t  ReturnErrno(const struct arch_seccomp_data&, void *aux);
-
-  static intptr_t  BpfFailure(const struct arch_seccomp_data& data, void *aux);
+  Instruction *CondExpression(CodeGen *gen, const ErrorCode& cond);
 
   static SandboxStatus status_;
-  static int           proc_fd_;
-  static Evaluators    evaluators_;
-  static Conds         conds_;
 
-  DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(Sandbox);
+  bool       quiet_;
+  int        proc_fd_;
+  Evaluators *evaluators_;
+  Conds      *conds_;
+
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Sandbox);
 };
 
 }  // namespace
 
 #endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__