Chromium Code Reviews
chromiumcodereview-hr@appspot.gserviceaccount.com (chromiumcodereview-hr) | Please choose your nickname with Settings | Help | Chromium Project | Gerrit Changes | Sign out
(1)

Unified Diff: third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc

Issue 12192024: Linux: grow a unique random mapping in ASLR (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: Add proper include protection. Created 7 years, 10 months ago
Use n/p to move between diff chunks; N/P to move between comments. Draft comments are only viewable by you.
Jump to:
View side-by-side diff with in-line comments
Download patch
« no previous file with comments | « base/security_unittest.cc ('k') | no next file » | no next file with comments »
Expand Comments ('e') | Collapse Comments ('c') | Show Comments Hide Comments ('s')
Index: third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc
diff --git a/third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc b/third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc
index 05338963505152ceb5301030f9762c2727ea95b4..2141d413ed50c3ebde4fe61dd81965a90ed59b93 100644
--- a/third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc
+++ b/third_party/tcmalloc/chromium/src/system-alloc.cc
@@ -137,6 +137,18 @@ void raninit(ranctx* x, u4 seed) {
}
}
+// If the kernel cannot honor the hint in arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown, it
+// will simply ignore it. So we give a hint that has a good chance of
+// working.
+// The mmap top-down allocator will normally allocate below TASK_SIZE - gap,
+// with a gap that depends on the max stack size. See x86/mm/mmap.c. We
+// should make allocations that are below this area, which would be
+// 0x7ffbf8000000.
+// We use 0x3ffffffff000 as the mask so that we only "pollute" half of the
+// address space. In the unlikely case where fragmentation would become an
+// issue, the kernel will still have another half to use.
+const uint64_t kRandomAddressMask = 0x3ffffffff000ULL;
+
#endif // defined(ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED)
// Give a random "hint" that is suitable for use with mmap(). This cannot make
@@ -177,22 +189,51 @@ void* GetRandomAddrHint() {
}
uint64_t random_address = (static_cast<uint64_t>(ranval(&ctx)) << 32) |
ranval(&ctx);
- // If the kernel cannot honor the hint in arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown, it
- // will simply ignore it. So we give a hint that has a good chance of
- // working.
- // The mmap top-down allocator will normally allocate below TASK_SIZE - gap,
- // with a gap that depends on the max stack size. See x86/mm/mmap.c. We
- // should make allocations that are below this area, which would be
- // 0x7ffbf8000000.
- // We use 0x3ffffffff000 as the mask so that we only "pollute" half of the
- // address space. In the unlikely case where fragmentation would become an
- // issue, the kernel will still have another half to use.
// A a bit-wise "and" won't bias our random distribution.
- random_address &= 0x3ffffffff000ULL;
+ random_address &= kRandomAddressMask;
return reinterpret_cast<void*>(random_address);
#endif // ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED
}
+// Allocate |length| bytes of memory using mmap(). The memory will be
+// readable and writeable, but not executable.
+// Like mmap(), we will return MAP_FAILED on failure.
+// |is_aslr_enabled| controls address space layout randomization. When true, we
+// will put the first mapping at a random address and will then try to grow it.
+// If it's not possible to grow an existing mapping, a new one will be created.
+void* AllocWithMmap(size_t length, bool is_aslr_enabled) {
+ // Note: we are protected by the general TCMalloc_SystemAlloc spinlock.
+ static void* address_hint = NULL;
+#if defined(ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED)
+ if (is_aslr_enabled &&
+ (!address_hint ||
+ reinterpret_cast<uint64_t>(address_hint) & ~kRandomAddressMask)) {
+ address_hint = GetRandomAddrHint();
+ }
+#endif // ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED
+
+ // address_hint is likely to make us grow an existing mapping.
+ void* result = mmap(address_hint, length, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+#if defined(ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED)
+ if (result == address_hint) {
+ // If mmap() succeeded at a address_hint, our next mmap() will try to grow
+ // the current mapping as long as it's compatible with our ASLR mask.
+ // This has been done for performance reasons, see crbug.com/173371.
+ // It should be possible to strike a better balance between performance
+ // and security but will be done at a later date.
+ // If this overflows, it could only set address_hint to NULL, which is
+ // what we want (and can't happen on the currently supported architecture).
+ address_hint = static_cast<char*>(result) + length;
+ } else {
+ // mmap failed or a collision prevented the kernel from honoring the hint,
+ // reset the hint.
+ address_hint = NULL;
+ }
+#endif // ASLR_IS_SUPPORTED
+ return result;
+}
+
} // Anonymous namespace to avoid name conflicts on "CheckAddressBits".
COMPILE_ASSERT(kAddressBits <= 8 * sizeof(void*),
@@ -405,14 +446,7 @@ void* MmapSysAllocator::Alloc(size_t size, size_t *actual_size,
// size + alignment < (1<<NBITS).
// and extra <= alignment
// therefore size + extra < (1<<NBITS)
- void* address_hint = NULL;
- if (FLAGS_malloc_random_allocator) {
- address_hint = GetRandomAddrHint();
- }
- void* result = mmap(address_hint, size + extra,
- PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS,
- -1, 0);
+ void* result = AllocWithMmap(size + extra, FLAGS_malloc_random_allocator);
if (result == reinterpret_cast<void*>(MAP_FAILED)) {
return NULL;
}
« no previous file with comments | « base/security_unittest.cc ('k') | no next file » | no next file with comments »

Powered by Google App Engine
This is Rietveld 408576698