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Unified Diff: base/security_unittest.cc

Issue 11857007: TCMalloc: restrict maximum size of memory ranges (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: Drive-by patch of int to size_t. Created 7 years, 11 months ago
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Index: base/security_unittest.cc
diff --git a/base/security_unittest.cc b/base/security_unittest.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8c2f0ea2a4b16bfc20abb195555fccf2ee313557
--- /dev/null
+++ b/base/security_unittest.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
Chris Evans 2013/01/15 01:53:08 2013
jln (very slow on Chromium) 2013/01/15 02:00:51 Done.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <limits>
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
+
+using std::nothrow;
+
+namespace {
+
+// Check that we can not allocate a memory range that cannot be indexed
+// via an int. This is used to mitigate vulnerabilities in libraries that use
+// int instead of size_t.
+// See crbug.com/169327.
+
+// - NO_TCMALLOC because we only patched tcmalloc
+// - ADDRESS_SANITIZER because it has its own memory allocator
+// - IOS does not seem to honor nothrow in new properly
+// - OS_MACOSX does not use tcmalloc
+#if !defined(NO_TCMALLOC) && !defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) && \
+ !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_MACOSX)
+ #define ALLOC_TEST(function) function
+#else
+ #define ALLOC_TEST(function) DISABLED_##function
+#endif
+
+// TODO(jln): switch to std::numeric_limits<int>::max() when we switch to
+// C++11.
+const size_t kMaxAllocSize = INT_MAX;
+
+// Detect runtime TCMalloc bypasses.
+bool IsTcMallocBypassed() {
+#if defined(OS_LINUX)
+ // This should detect a TCMalloc bypass from Valgrind.
+ char* g_slice = getenv("G_SLICE");
+ if (g_slice && !strcmp(g_slice, "always-malloc"))
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+
+// Fake test that allow to know the state of TCMalloc by looking at bots.
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(IsTCMallocDynamicallyBypassed)) {
+ printf("Malloc is dynamically bypassed: %s\n",
+ IsTcMallocBypassed() ? "yes." : "no.");
+}
+
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(MemoryAllocationRestrictionsMalloc)) {
+ if (!IsTcMallocBypassed()) {
+ scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter>
+ ptr(static_cast<char*>(malloc(kMaxAllocSize)));
Chris Evans 2013/01/15 01:53:08 It's weird to have a test that "kMaxAllocSize" act
jln (very slow on Chromium) 2013/01/15 02:00:51 Good point, done.
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ptr == NULL);
Chris Evans 2013/01/15 01:53:08 Indentation.
Chris Evans 2013/01/15 01:53:08 Indentation
jln (very slow on Chromium) 2013/01/15 02:00:51 Done.
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(MemoryAllocationRestrictionsCalloc)) {
+ if (!IsTcMallocBypassed()) {
+ scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter>
+ ptr(static_cast<char*>(calloc(kMaxAllocSize, 1)));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ptr == NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(MemoryAllocationRestrictionsRealloc)) {
+ if (!IsTcMallocBypassed()) {
+ char* orig_ptr = static_cast<char*>(malloc(1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(orig_ptr != NULL);
+ scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter>
+ ptr(static_cast<char*>(realloc(orig_ptr, kMaxAllocSize)));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ptr == NULL);
+ // If realloc() did not succeed, we need to free orig_ptr.
+ free(orig_ptr);
+ }
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ char large_array[kMaxAllocSize];
+} VeryLargeStruct;
+
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(MemoryAllocationRestrictionsNew)) {
+ if (!IsTcMallocBypassed()) {
+ scoped_ptr<VeryLargeStruct> ptr(new (nothrow) VeryLargeStruct);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ptr == NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(SecurityTest, ALLOC_TEST(MemoryAllocationRestrictionsNewArray)) {
+ if (!IsTcMallocBypassed()) {
+ scoped_array<char> ptr(new (nothrow) char[kMaxAllocSize]);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ptr == NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+// This would be a test for a much stricter restriction preventing a contiguous
+// memory area of size MaximumAllocSize to be allocated via malloc.
+// Implementing this requires more effort and the test is disabled.
Chris Evans 2013/01/15 01:53:08 I think we're better off not landing to be honest?
jln (very slow on Chromium) 2013/01/15 02:00:51 Done.
+TEST(SecurityTest, DISABLED_MemoryAllocationRestrictionsStepped) {
+ const int kAllocNumber = 8;
+ const size_t kSteppedAllocSize = kMaxAllocSize / kAllocNumber;
+ // Allow 1/32th for MetaData and padding.
+ const size_t kExpectedExtra = kSteppedAllocSize >> 5;
+
+ bool is_contiguous = true;
+ // Make kAllocNumber successive allocations and compare the successive
+ // pointers to detect adjacent mappings.
+ scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> ptr[kAllocNumber];
+ for (int i = 0; i < kAllocNumber; ++i) {
+ ptr[i].reset(static_cast<char*>(malloc(kSteppedAllocSize)));
+ if (ptr[i] == NULL) {
+ is_contiguous = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i > 0) {
+ size_t pointer_diff = static_cast<size_t>(
+ std::max(ptr[i].get(), ptr[i - 1].get()) -
+ std::min(ptr[i].get(), ptr[i - 1].get()));
+ if (pointer_diff > (kSteppedAllocSize + kExpectedExtra)) {
+ is_contiguous = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ASSERT_FALSE(is_contiguous);
+}
+
+} // namespace

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