SECCOMP-BPF: Added supported for inspection system call arguments from BPF filters.

content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc

Index: content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
index 8761e896447f7daed93724160748c41d1b0baaea..28d81415f463ecff6b1d90dce3e30d6f49887c19 100644
--- a/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
 }
 
 ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
-  if (!Sandbox::isValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
+  if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
     // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
     return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
   }
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
 // This will still deny x32 or IA32 calls in 64 bits mode or
 // 64 bits system calls in compatibility mode.
 ErrorCode AllowAllPolicy(int sysno, void *) {
-  if (!Sandbox::isValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
+  if (!Sandbox::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
     // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
     return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
   } else {
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool SandboxSeccompBpf::SupportsSandbox() {
   // TODO(jln): pass the saved proc_fd_ from the LinuxSandbox singleton
   // here.
   Sandbox::SandboxStatus bpf_sandbox_status =
-      Sandbox::supportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
+      Sandbox::SupportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
   // Kernel support is what we are interested in here. Other status
   // such as STATUS_UNAVAILABLE (has threads) still indicate kernel support.
   // We make this a negative check, since if there is a bug, we would rather