Add GCM, CTR, and CTS modes to AES.

nss/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c

Index: nss/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c
===================================================================
--- nss/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c	(revision 0)
+++ nss/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c	(revision 0)
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+#include "blapit.h"
+#include "blapii.h"
+#include "cts.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+
+struct CTSContextStr {
+    freeblCipherFunc cipher;
+    void *context;
+    /* iv stores the last ciphertext block of the previous message.
+     * Only used by decrypt. */
+    unsigned char iv[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+CTSContext *
+CTS_CreateContext(void *context, freeblCipherFunc cipher,
+		  const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    CTSContext  *cts;
+
+    if (blocksize > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    cts = PORT_ZNew(CTSContext);
+    if (cts == NULL) {
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, iv, blocksize);
+    cts->cipher = cipher;
+    cts->context = context;
+    return cts;
+}
+
+void
+CTS_DestroyContext(CTSContext *cts, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    if (freeit) {
+	PORT_Free(cts);
+    }
+}
+	
+/*
+ * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
+ * Generically handle cipher text stealing. Basically this is doing CBC
+ * operations except someone can pass us a partial block.
+ *
+ *  Output Order:
+ *  CS-1:  C1||C2||C3..Cn-1(could be partial)||Cn   (NIST)
+ *  CS-2: pad == 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn-1(is full)||Cn   (Schneier)
+ *  CS-2: pad != 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(is partial)(Schneier)
+ *  CS-3: C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(could be partial)   (Kerberos)
+ *
+ * The characteristics of these three options:
+ *  - NIST & Schneier (CS-1 & CS-2) are identical to CBC if there are no
+ * partial blocks on input.
+ *  - Scheier and Kerberos (CS-2 and CS-3) have no embedded partial blocks,
+ * which make decoding easier.
+ *  - NIST & Kerberos (CS-1 and CS-3) have consistent block order independent
+ * of padding.
+ *
+ * PKCS #11 did not specify which version to implement, but points to the NIST
+ * spec, so this code implements CTS-CS-1 from NIST.
+ *
+ * To convert the returned buffer to:
+ *   CS-2 (Schneier): do
+ *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
+ *       if (pad) {
+ *          memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
+ *          memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
+ *	    memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
+ *       }
+ *   CS-3 (Kerberos): do
+ *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ *       pad = *outlen % blocksize;
+ *       if (pad == 0) {
+ *           pad = blocksize;
+ *       }
+ *       memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
+ *       memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
+ *	 memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
+ */
+SECStatus
+CTS_EncryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
+		unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+		const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+		unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned int tmp;
+    int fullblocks;
+    int written;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (inlen < blocksize) {
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (maxout < inlen) {
+	*outlen = inlen;
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+    fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize;
+    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
+	 fullblocks, blocksize);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PORT_Assert(*outlen == fullblocks);
+    inbuf += fullblocks;
+    inlen -= fullblocks;
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+	return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    written = *outlen - (blocksize - inlen);
+    outbuf += written;
+    maxout -= written;
+
+    /*
+     * here's the CTS magic, we pad our final block with zeros,
+     * then do a CBC encrypt. CBC will xor our plain text with
+     * the previous block (Cn-1), capturing part of that block (Cn-1**) as it
+     * xors with the zero pad. We then write this full block, overwritting
+     * (Cn-1**) in our buffer. This allows us to have input data == output
+     * data since Cn contains enough information to reconver Cn-1** when
+     * we decrypt (at the cost of some complexity as you can see in decrypt
+     * below */
+    PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
+    PORT_Memset(lastBlock + inlen, 0, blocksize - inlen);
+    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, &tmp, maxout, lastBlock,
+			blocksize, blocksize);
+    PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+	PORT_Assert(tmp == blocksize);
+	*outlen = written + blocksize;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+
+#define XOR_BLOCK(x,y,count) for(i=0; i < count; i++) x[i] = x[i] ^ y[i]
+
+/*
+ * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
+ * Decrypt, Expect CS-1: input. See the comment on the encrypt side
+ * to understand what CS-2 and CS-3 mean.
+ *
+ * To convert the input buffer to CS-1 from ...
+ *   CS-2 (Schneier): do
+ *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ *       pad = inlen % blocksize;
+ *       if (pad) {
+ *          memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize);
+ *          memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad);
+ *	    memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize);
+ *       }
+ *   CS-3 (Kerberos): do
+ *       unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ *       pad = inlen % blocksize;
+ *       if (pad == 0) {
+ *           pad = blocksize;
+ *       }
+ *       memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize);
+ *       memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad);
+ *	 memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize);
+ */
+SECStatus
+CTS_DecryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
+		unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
+		const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
+		unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+    unsigned char *Pn;
+    unsigned char Cn_2[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-2 */
+    unsigned char Cn_1[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-1 */
+    unsigned char Cn[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];   /* block Cn   */
+    unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    const unsigned char *tmp;
+    unsigned int tmpLen;
+    int fullblocks, pad;
+    unsigned int i;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (inlen < blocksize) {
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (maxout < inlen) {
+	*outlen = inlen;
+	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize;
+
+    /* even though we expect the input to be CS-1, CS-2 is easier to parse,
+     * so convert to CS-2 immediately. NOTE: this is the same code as in
+     * the comment for encrypt. NOTE2: since we can't modify inbuf unless
+     * inbuf and outbuf overlap, just copy inbuf to outbuf and modify it there
+     */
+    pad = blocksize + (inlen - fullblocks);
+    if (pad != blocksize) {
+	if (inbuf != outbuf) {
+	    memcpy(outbuf, inbuf, inlen);
+	    /* keep the names so we logically know how we are using the
+	     * buffers */
+	    inbuf = outbuf;
+	}
+	memcpy(lastBlock,        inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize);
+	/* we know inbuf == outbuf now, inbuf is declared const and can't
+	 * be the target, so use outbuf for the target here */
+	memcpy(outbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, inbuf+inlen-pad, pad);
+	memcpy(outbuf+inlen-blocksize,     lastBlock,       blocksize);
+    }
+    /* save the previous to last block so we can undo the misordered
+     * chaining */
+    tmp =  (fullblocks < blocksize*2) ? cts->iv :
+			inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize*2;
+    PORT_Memcpy(Cn_2, tmp, blocksize);
+    PORT_Memcpy(Cn, inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize, blocksize);
+    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
+	 fullblocks, blocksize);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PORT_Assert(*outlen == fullblocks);
+    inbuf += fullblocks;
+    inlen -= fullblocks;
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+	return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    outbuf += fullblocks;
+    maxout -= fullblocks;
+
+    /* recover the stolen text */
+    PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
+    PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(Cn_1, inbuf, inlen);
+    Pn = outbuf-blocksize;
+    /* inbuf points to Cn-1* in the input buffer */
+    /* NOTE: below there are 2 sections marked "make up for the out of order
+     * cbc decryption". You may ask, what is going on here.
+     *   Short answer: CBC automatically xors the plain text with the previous
+     * encrypted block. We are decrypting the last 2 blocks out of order, so
+     * we have to 'back out' the decrypt xor and 'add back' the encrypt xor.
+     *   Long answer: When we encrypted, we encrypted as follows:
+     *       Pn-2, Pn-1, (Pn || 0), but on decryption we can't
+     *  decrypt Cn-1 until we decrypt Cn because part of Cn-1 is stored in
+     *  Cn (see below).  So above we decrypted all the full blocks:
+     *       Cn-2, Cn,
+     *  to get:
+     *       Pn-2, Pn, Except that Pn is not yet corect. On encrypt, we
+     *  xor'd Pn || 0  with Cn-1, but on decrypt we xor'd it with Cn-2
+     *  To recover Pn, we xor the block with Cn-1* || 0 (in last block) and
+     *  Cn-2 to get Pn || Cn-1**. Pn can then be written to the output buffer
+     *  and we can now reunite Cn-1. With the full Cn-1 we can decrypt it,
+     *  but now decrypt is going to xor the decrypted data with Cn instead of
+     *  Cn-2. xoring Cn and Cn-2 restores the original Pn-1 and we can now
+     *  write that oout to the buffer */
+
+    /* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */
+    XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Cn_2, blocksize);
+    XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Pn, blocksize);
+    /* last buf now has Pn || Cn-1**, copy out Pn */
+    PORT_Memcpy(outbuf, lastBlock, inlen);
+    *outlen += inlen;
+    /* copy Cn-1* into last buf to recover Cn-1 */
+    PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, Cn-1, inlen);
+    /* note: because Cn and Cn-1 were out of order, our pointer to Pn also
+     * points to where Pn-1 needs to reside. From here on out read Pn in
+     * the code as really Pn-1. */
+    rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, Pn, &tmpLen, blocksize, lastBlock,
+	 blocksize, blocksize);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+	return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PORT_Assert(tmpLen == blocksize);
+    /* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */
+    XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn_2, blocksize);
+    XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn, blocksize);
+    /* reset iv to Cn  */
+    PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, Cn, blocksize);
+    /* This makes Cn the last block for the next decrypt operation, which
+     * matches the encrypt. We don't care about the contexts of last block,
+     * only the side effect of setting the internal IV */
+    (void) (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, lastBlock, &tmpLen, blocksize, Cn,
+		blocksize, blocksize);
+    /* clear last block. At this point last block contains Pn xor Cn_1 xor
+     * Cn_2, both of with an attacker would know, so we need to clear this
+     * buffer out */
+    PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
+    /* Cn, Cn_1, and Cn_2 have encrypted data, so no need to clear them */
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
Property changes on: nss/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c
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Added: svn:eol-style
   + LF