Create a class for seccomp-bpf sandboxing in content.

content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc

Index: content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc b/content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc
index b9cafa2f2bcb702ce54b7bcf4adc97538cf0e965..46db79573c30dfc12e7d2fe667c4ff8421518ee8 100644
--- a/content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_init_linux.cc
@@ -2,574 +2,47 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
-#include "content/common/seccomp_sandbox.h"
-#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
-
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-
-// This is an assert for GYP
-#if !defined(OS_LINUX)
-  #error "Linux specific file compiled on non Linux OS!"
-#endif
-
-#include <asm/unistd.h>
-#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/filter.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <ucontext.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <vector>
+#include <string>
 
 #include "base/command_line.h"
-#include "base/file_util.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
-#include "base/time.h"
 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux.h"
 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
-
-// These are fairly new and not defined in all headers yet.
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-
-#ifndef __NR_process_vm_readv
-  #define __NR_process_vm_readv 310
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_process_vm_writev
-  #define __NR_process_vm_writev 311
-#endif
-
-#elif defined(__i386__)
-
-#ifndef __NR_process_vm_readv
-  #define __NR_process_vm_readv 347
-#endif
-
-#ifndef __NR_process_vm_writev
-  #define __NR_process_vm_writev 348
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-namespace {
-
-bool IsSingleThreaded() {
-  // Possibly racy, but it's ok because this is more of a debug check to catch
-  // new threaded situations arising during development.
-  int num_threads =
-    file_util::CountFilesCreatedAfter(FilePath("/proc/self/task"),
-                                      base::Time::UnixEpoch());
-
-  // We pass the test if we don't know ( == 0), because the setuid sandbox
-  // will prevent /proc access in some contexts.
-  return num_threads == 1 || num_threads == 0;
-}
-
-inline bool IsChromeOS() {
-#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
-  return true;
-#else
-  return false;
-#endif
-}
-
-void LogSandboxStarted(const std::string& sandbox_name,
-                       const std::string& process_type) {
-  const std::string activated_sandbox =
-      "Activated " + sandbox_name + " sandbox for process type: " +
-      process_type + ".";
-  if (IsChromeOS()) {
-    LOG(WARNING) << activated_sandbox;
-  } else {
-    VLOG(1) << activated_sandbox;
-  }
-}
-
-intptr_t CrashSIGSYS_Handler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) {
-  int syscall = args.nr;
-  if (syscall >= 1024)
-    syscall = 0;
-  // Encode 8-bits of the 1st two arguments too, so we can discern which socket
-  // type, which fcntl, ... etc., without being likely to hit a mapped
-  // address.
-  // Do not encode more bits here without thinking about increasing the
-  // likelihood of collision with mapped pages.
-  syscall |= ((args.args[0] & 0xffUL) << 12);
-  syscall |= ((args.args[1] & 0xffUL) << 20);
-  // Purposefully dereference the syscall as an address so it'll show up very
-  // clearly and easily in crash dumps.
-  volatile char* addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(syscall);
-  *addr = '\0';
-  // In case we hit a mapped address, hit the null page with just the syscall,
-  // for paranoia.
-  syscall &= 0xfffUL;
-  addr = reinterpret_cast<volatile char*>(syscall);
-  *addr = '\0';
-  for (;;)
-    _exit(1);
-}
-
-// TODO(jln) we need to restrict the first parameter!
-bool IsKillSyscall(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_kill:
-    case __NR_tkill:
-    case __NR_tgkill:
-      return true;
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-
-bool IsGettimeSyscall(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_clock_gettime:
-    case __NR_gettimeofday:
-    case __NR_time:
-      return true;
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-
-bool IsFileSystemSyscall(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_open:
-    case __NR_openat:
-    case __NR_execve:
-    case __NR_access:
-    case __NR_mkdir:
-    case __NR_mkdirat:
-    case __NR_readlink:
-    case __NR_readlinkat:
-    case __NR_stat:
-    case __NR_lstat:
-    case __NR_chdir:
-    case __NR_mknod:
-    case __NR_mknodat:
-      return true;
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-
-bool IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled() {
-  // Accelerated video decode is currently enabled on Chrome OS,
-  // but not on Linux: crbug.com/137247.
-  bool is_enabled = IsChromeOS();
-
-  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
-  is_enabled = is_enabled &&
-      !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
-
-  return is_enabled;
-}
-
-static const char kDriRcPath[] = "/etc/drirc";
-
-// TODO(jorgelo): limited to /etc/drirc for now, extend this to cover
-// other sandboxed file access cases.
-int OpenWithCache(const char* pathname, int flags) {
-  static int drircfd = -1;
-  static bool do_open = true;
-  int res = -1;
-
-  if (strcmp(pathname, kDriRcPath) == 0 && flags == O_RDONLY) {
-    if (do_open) {
-      drircfd = open(pathname, flags);
-      do_open = false;
-      res = drircfd;
-    } else {
-      // dup() man page:
-      // "After a successful return from one of these system calls,
-      // the old and new file descriptors may be used interchangeably.
-      // They refer to the same open file description and thus share
-      // file offset and file status flags; for example, if the file offset
-      // is modified by using lseek(2) on one of the descriptors,
-      // the offset is also changed for the other."
-      // Since |drircfd| can be dup()'ed and read many times, we need to
-      // lseek() it to the beginning of the file before returning.
-      // We assume the caller will not keep more than one fd open at any
-      // one time. Intel driver code in Mesa that parses /etc/drirc does
-      // open()/read()/close() in the same function.
-      if (drircfd < 0) {
-        errno = ENOENT;
-        return -1;
-      }
-      int newfd = dup(drircfd);
-      if (newfd < 0) {
-        errno = ENOMEM;
-        return -1;
-      }
-      if (lseek(newfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == static_cast<off_t>(-1)) {
-        (void) HANDLE_EINTR(close(newfd));
-        errno = ENOMEM;
-        return -1;
-      }
-      res = newfd;
-    }
-  } else {
-    res = open(pathname, flags);
-  }
-
-  return res;
-}
-
-// We allow the GPU process to open /etc/drirc because it's needed by Mesa.
-// OpenWithCache() has been called before enabling the sandbox, and has cached
-// a file descriptor for /etc/drirc.
-intptr_t GpuOpenSIGSYS_Handler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
-                               void* aux) {
-  uint64_t arg0 = args.args[0];
-  uint64_t arg1 = args.args[1];
-  const char* pathname = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(arg0);
-  int flags = static_cast<int>(arg1);
-
-  if (strcmp(pathname, kDriRcPath) == 0) {
-    int ret = OpenWithCache(pathname, flags);
-    return (ret == -1) ? -errno : ret;
-  } else {
-    return -ENOENT;
-  }
-}
-
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-// x86_64 only because it references system calls that are multiplexed on IA32.
-playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy_x86_64(int sysno) {
-  switch(sysno) {
-    case __NR_read:
-    case __NR_ioctl:
-    case __NR_poll:
-    case __NR_epoll_wait:
-    case __NR_recvfrom:
-    case __NR_write:
-    case __NR_writev:
-    case __NR_gettid:
-    case __NR_sched_yield:  // Nvidia binary driver.
-
-    case __NR_futex:
-    case __NR_madvise:
-    case __NR_sendmsg:
-    case __NR_recvmsg:
-    case __NR_eventfd2:
-    case __NR_pipe:
-    case __NR_mmap:
-    case __NR_mprotect:
-    case __NR_clone:  // TODO(jln) restrict flags.
-    case __NR_set_robust_list:
-    case __NR_getuid:
-    case __NR_geteuid:
-    case __NR_getgid:
-    case __NR_getegid:
-    case __NR_epoll_create:
-    case __NR_fcntl:
-    case __NR_socketpair:
-    case __NR_epoll_ctl:
-    case __NR_prctl:
-    case __NR_fstat:
-    case __NR_close:
-    case __NR_restart_syscall:
-    case __NR_rt_sigreturn:
-    case __NR_brk:
-    case __NR_rt_sigprocmask:
-    case __NR_munmap:
-    case __NR_dup:
-    case __NR_mlock:
-    case __NR_munlock:
-    case __NR_exit:
-    case __NR_exit_group:
-    case __NR_lseek:
-    case __NR_getpid:  // Nvidia binary driver.
-    case __NR_getppid:  // ATI binary driver.
-    case __NR_shutdown:  // Virtual driver.
-    case __NR_rt_sigaction:  // Breakpad signal handler.
-      return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-    case __NR_socket:
-      return EACCES;  // Nvidia binary driver.
-    case __NR_fchmod:
-      return EPERM;  // ATI binary driver.
-    case __NR_open:
-      // Accelerated video decode is enabled by default only on Chrome OS.
-      if (IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled()) {
-        // Accelerated video decode needs to open /dev/dri/card0, and
-        // dup()'ing an already open file descriptor does not work.
-        // Allow open() even though it severely weakens the sandbox,
-        // to test the sandboxing mechanism in general.
-        // TODO(jorgelo): remove this once we solve the libva issue.
-        return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-      } else {
-        // Hook open() in the GPU process to allow opening /etc/drirc,
-        // needed by Mesa.
-        // The hook needs dup(), lseek(), and close() to be allowed.
-        return playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode(GpuOpenSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
-      }
-    default:
-      if (IsGettimeSyscall(sysno) ||
-          IsKillSyscall(sysno)) { // GPU watchdog.
-        return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-      }
-      // Generally, filename-based syscalls will fail with ENOENT to behave
-      // similarly to a possible future setuid sandbox.
-      if (IsFileSystemSyscall(sysno)) {
-        return ENOENT;
-      }
-      // In any other case crash the program with our SIGSYS handler
-      return playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
-  }
-}
-
-// x86_64 only because it references system calls that are multiplexed on IA32.
-playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy_x86_64(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_futex:
-    case __NR_write:
-    case __NR_epoll_wait:
-    case __NR_read:
-    case __NR_times:
-    case __NR_clone:  // TODO(jln): restrict flags.
-    case __NR_set_robust_list:
-    case __NR_getuid:
-    case __NR_geteuid:
-    case __NR_getgid:
-    case __NR_getegid:
-    case __NR_epoll_create:
-    case __NR_fcntl:
-    case __NR_socketpair:
-    case __NR_pipe:
-    case __NR_epoll_ctl:
-    case __NR_gettid:
-    case __NR_prctl:
-    case __NR_fstat:
-    case __NR_sendmsg:
-    case __NR_mmap:
-    case __NR_munmap:
-    case __NR_mprotect:
-    case __NR_madvise:
-    case __NR_rt_sigaction:
-    case __NR_rt_sigprocmask:
-    case __NR_wait4:
-    case __NR_exit_group:
-    case __NR_exit:
-    case __NR_rt_sigreturn:
-    case __NR_restart_syscall:
-    case __NR_close:
-    case __NR_recvmsg:
-    case __NR_lseek:
-    case __NR_brk:
-    case __NR_sched_yield:
-    case __NR_shutdown:
-    case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
-    case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
-    case __NR_dup:  // Flash Access.
-    // These are under investigation, and hopefully not here for the long term.
-    case __NR_shmctl:
-    case __NR_shmat:
-    case __NR_shmdt:
-      return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-    case __NR_ioctl:
-      return ENOTTY;  // Flash Access.
-    case __NR_socket:
-      return EACCES;
-    default:
-      if (IsGettimeSyscall(sysno) ||
-          IsKillSyscall(sysno)) {
-        return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-      }
-      if (IsFileSystemSyscall(sysno)) {
-        return ENOENT;
-      }
-      // In any other case crash the program with our SIGSYS handler.
-      return playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
-  }
-}
-#endif
-
-playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode BlacklistPtracePolicy(int sysno) {
-  if (sysno < static_cast<int>(MIN_SYSCALL) ||
-      sysno > static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL)) {
-    // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
-    return ENOSYS;
-  }
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_ptrace:
-    case __NR_process_vm_readv:
-    case __NR_process_vm_writev:
-    case __NR_migrate_pages:
-    case __NR_move_pages:
-      return playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode(CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
-    default:
-      return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-  }
-}
-
-// Allow all syscalls.
-// This will still deny x32 or IA32 calls in 64 bits mode or
-// 64 bits system calls in compatibility mode.
-playground2::Sandbox::ErrorCode AllowAllPolicy(int sysno) {
-  if (sysno < static_cast<int>(MIN_SYSCALL) ||
-      sysno > static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL)) {
-    // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
-    return ENOSYS;
-  } else {
-    return playground2::Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
-  }
-}
-
-// Warms up/preloads resources needed by the policies.
-void WarmupPolicy(playground2::Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall policy) {
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-  if (policy == GpuProcessPolicy_x86_64) {
-    OpenWithCache(kDriRcPath, O_RDONLY);
-    // Accelerated video decode dlopen()'s this shared object
-    // inside the sandbox, so preload it now.
-    // TODO(jorgelo): generalize this to other platforms.
-    if (IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled()) {
-      const char kI965DrvVideoPath_64[] =
-          "/usr/lib64/va/drivers/i965_drv_video.so";
-      dlopen(kI965DrvVideoPath_64, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
-    }
-  }
-#endif
-}
-
-// Is the sandbox fully disabled for this process?
-bool ShouldDisableBpfSandbox(const CommandLine& command_line,
-                             const std::string& process_type) {
-  if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
-      command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox)) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
-    // The GPU sandbox is disabled by default in ChromeOS, enabled by default on
-    // generic Linux.
-    // TODO(jorgelo): when we feel comfortable, make this a policy decision
-    // instead. (i.e. move this to GetProcessSyscallPolicy) and return an
-    // AllowAllPolicy for lack of "--enable-gpu-sandbox".
-    bool should_disable;
-    if (IsChromeOS()) {
-      should_disable = true;
-    } else {
-      should_disable = false;
-    }
-
-    if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableGpuSandbox))
-      should_disable = false;
-    if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))
-      should_disable = true;
-    return should_disable;
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-playground2::Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall GetProcessSyscallPolicy(
-    const CommandLine& command_line,
-    const std::string& process_type) {
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-  if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
-    return GpuProcessPolicy_x86_64;
-  }
+#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
 
-  if (process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
-    // TODO(jln): figure out what to do with non-Flash PPAPI
-    // out-of-process plug-ins.
-    return FlashProcessPolicy_x86_64;
-  }
+namespace content {
 
-  if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess ||
-      process_type == switches::kWorkerProcess) {
-    return BlacklistPtracePolicy;
-  }
-  NOTREACHED();
-  // This will be our default if we need one.
-  return AllowAllPolicy;
-#else
-  // On IA32, we only have a small blacklist at the moment.
-  (void) process_type;
-  return BlacklistPtracePolicy;
-#endif  // __x86_64__
-}
+// TODO(jln): have call sites provide a process / policy type to
+// InitializeSandbox().
+void InitializeSandbox() {
+  bool seccomp_legacy_started = false;
+  LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox = LinuxSandbox::GetInstance();
+  const std::string process_type =
+      CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
+                                            switches::kProcessType);
 
-// Initialize the seccomp-bpf sandbox.
-bool InitializeBpfSandbox_x86(const CommandLine& command_line,
-                               const std::string& process_type) {
-  if (ShouldDisableBpfSandbox(command_line, process_type))
-    return false;
 
-  // No matter what, InitializeSandbox() should always be called before threads
-  // are started.
-  // Note: IsSingleThreaded() will be true if /proc is not accessible!
-  if (!IsSingleThreaded()) {
+  // No matter what, it's always an error to call InitializeSandbox() after
+  // threads have been created.
+  if (!linux_sandbox->IsSingleThreaded()) {
     std::string error_message = "InitializeSandbox() called with multiple "
                                 "threads in process " + process_type;
     // TODO(jln): change this into a CHECK() once we are more comfortable it
     // does not trigger.
-    // On non-DEBUG build, we still log an error
     LOG(ERROR) << error_message;
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // TODO(jln): find a way for the Zygote processes under the setuid sandbox to
-  // have a /proc fd and pass it here.
-  // Passing -1 as the /proc fd since we have no special way to have it for
-  // now.
-  if (playground2::Sandbox::supportsSeccompSandbox(-1) !=
-      playground2::Sandbox::STATUS_AVAILABLE) {
-    return false;
+    return;
   }
 
-  playground2::Sandbox::EvaluateSyscall SyscallPolicy =
-      GetProcessSyscallPolicy(command_line, process_type);
-
-  // Warms up resources needed by the policy we're about to enable.
-  WarmupPolicy(SyscallPolicy);
-
-  playground2::Sandbox::setSandboxPolicy(SyscallPolicy, NULL);
-  playground2::Sandbox::startSandbox();
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-}  // anonymous namespace
-
-#endif  // defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-
-namespace content {
-
-void InitializeSandbox() {
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
-  const std::string process_type =
-      command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
-  bool seccomp_legacy_started = false;
-  bool seccomp_bpf_started = false;
-
   // First, try to enable seccomp-legacy.
-  seccomp_legacy_started =
-      LinuxSandbox::GetInstance()->StartSeccompLegacy(process_type);
-  if (seccomp_legacy_started)
-    LogSandboxStarted("seccomp-legacy", process_type);
+  seccomp_legacy_started = linux_sandbox->StartSeccompLegacy(process_type);
 
   // Then, try to enable seccomp-bpf.
   // If seccomp-legacy is enabled, seccomp-bpf initialization will crash
   // instead of failing gracefully.
   // TODO(markus): fix this (crbug.com/139872).
   if (!seccomp_legacy_started) {
-    seccomp_bpf_started =
-        InitializeBpfSandbox_x86(command_line, process_type);
+    linux_sandbox->StartSeccompBpf(process_type);
   }
-  if (seccomp_bpf_started)
-    LogSandboxStarted("seccomp-bpf", process_type);
-#endif
 }
 
 }  // namespace content