Refactored ErrorCode into it's own class

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_unittest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include <ostream>
 
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/verifier.h"
 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
 
@@ skipping 22 matching lines @@
             << "\n";
 }
 
 SANDBOX_TEST(SandboxBpf, CallSupportsTwice) {
   Sandbox::supportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
   Sandbox::supportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
 }
 
 // A simple blacklist test
 
-Sandbox::ErrorCode BlacklistNanosleepPolicy(int sysno) {
+ErrorCode BlacklistNanosleepPolicy(int sysno) {
   if (sysno < static_cast<int>(MIN_SYSCALL) ||
       sysno > static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL)) {
     // FIXME: we should really not have to do that in a trivial policy
-    return ENOSYS;
+    return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
   }
   switch (sysno) {
     case __NR_nanosleep:
-      return EACCES;
+      return ErrorCode(EACCES);
     default:
-      return Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
   }
 }
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBpf, ApplyBasicBlacklistPolicy, BlacklistNanosleepPolicy) {
   // nanosleep() should be denied
   const struct timespec ts = {0, 0};
   errno = 0;
   BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_nanosleep, &ts, NULL) == -1);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == EACCES);
 }
 
 // Now do a simple whitelist test
 
-Sandbox::ErrorCode WhitelistGetpidPolicy(int sysno) {
+ErrorCode WhitelistGetpidPolicy(int sysno) {
   switch (sysno) {
     case __NR_getpid:
     case __NR_exit_group:
-      return Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
     default:
-      return ENOMEM;
+      return ErrorCode(ENOMEM);
   }
 }
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBpf, ApplyBasicWhitelistPolicy, WhitelistGetpidPolicy) {
   // getpid() should be allowed
   errno = 0;
   BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) > 0);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == 0);
 
   // getpgid() should be denied
   BPF_ASSERT(getpgid(0) == -1);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == ENOMEM);
 }
 
 // A simple blacklist policy, with a SIGSYS handler
 
 // TODO: provide an API to provide the auxiliary data pointer
 // to the evaluator
 
 static int BlacklistNanosleepPolicySigsysAuxData;
 
 intptr_t EnomemHandler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void *aux) {
   // We also check that the auxiliary data is correct
   SANDBOX_ASSERT(aux);
   *(static_cast<int*>(aux)) = kExpectedReturnValue;
   return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
-Sandbox::ErrorCode BlacklistNanosleepPolicySigsys(int sysno) {
+ErrorCode BlacklistNanosleepPolicySigsys(int sysno) {
   if (sysno < static_cast<int>(MIN_SYSCALL) ||
       sysno > static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL)) {
     // FIXME: we should really not have to do that in a trivial policy
-    return ENOSYS;
+    return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
   }
   switch (sysno) {
     case __NR_nanosleep:
-      return Sandbox::ErrorCode(EnomemHandler,
+      return Sandbox::Trap(EnomemHandler,
                  static_cast<void *>(&BlacklistNanosleepPolicySigsysAuxData));
     default:
-      return Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
   }
 }
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBpf, BasicBlacklistWithSigsys,
          BlacklistNanosleepPolicySigsys) {
   // getpid() should work properly
   errno = 0;
   BPF_ASSERT(syscall(__NR_getpid) > 0);
   BPF_ASSERT(errno == 0);
 
@@ skipping 16 matching lines @@
 // We try to make sure we exercise optimizations in the BPF compiler. We make
 // sure that the compiler can have an opportunity to coalesce syscalls with
 // contiguous numbers and we also make sure that disjoint sets can return the
 // same errno.
 int SysnoToRandomErrno(int sysno) {
   // Small contiguous sets of 3 system calls return an errno equal to the
   // index of that set + 1 (so that we never return a NUL errno).
   return ((sysno & ~3) >> 2) % 29 + 1;
 }
 
-Sandbox::ErrorCode SyntheticPolicy(int sysno) {
+ErrorCode SyntheticPolicy(int sysno) {
   if (sysno < static_cast<int>(MIN_SYSCALL) ||
       sysno > static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL)) {
     // FIXME: we should really not have to do that in a trivial policy.
-    return ENOSYS;
+    return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
   }
 
   // TODO(jorgelo): remove this restriction once crbug.com/141694 is fixed.
 #if defined(__arm__)
   if (sysno > kArmPublicSysnoCeiling)
     return ENOSYS;
 #endif
 
   // TODO(markus): allow calls to write(). This should start working as soon
   //   as we switch to the new code generator. Currently we are blowing up,
   //   because our jumptable is getting too big.
   if (sysno == __NR_exit_group /* || sysno == __NR_write */) {
     // exit_group() is special, we really need it to work.
-    // write() is needed for BPF_ASSERT() to report a useful error message.
-    return Sandbox::SB_ALLOWED;
+    return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
   } else {
-    return SysnoToRandomErrno(sysno);
+    return ErrorCode(SysnoToRandomErrno(sysno));
   }
 }
 
 BPF_TEST(SandboxBpf, SyntheticPolicy, SyntheticPolicy) {
   // Ensure that that kExpectedReturnValue + syscallnumber + 1 does not int
   // overflow.
   BPF_ASSERT(
    std::numeric_limits<int>::max() - kExpectedReturnValue - 1 >=
    static_cast<int>(MAX_SYSCALL));
 
@@ skipping 12 matching lines @@
       // exit_group() is special
       continue;
     }
     errno = 0;
     BPF_ASSERT(syscall(syscall_number) == -1);
     BPF_ASSERT(errno == SysnoToRandomErrno(syscall_number));
   }
 }
 
 } // namespace