Create a LinuxSandbox class

content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc

Index: content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
diff --git a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
index f9b821b0873e7486f9b9454b43f52ba8edfa5512..0b9ff5613a0631dab2f0f5e3444bb4cecab52152 100644
--- a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
+++ b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
@@ -28,8 +28,7 @@
 #include "crypto/nss_util.h"
 #include "content/common/font_config_ipc_linux.h"
 #include "content/common/pepper_plugin_registry.h"
-#include "content/common/sandbox_methods_linux.h"
-#include "content/common/seccomp_sandbox.h"
+#include "content/common/sandbox_linux.h"
 #include "content/common/zygote_commands_linux.h"
 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
 #include "content/public/common/main_function_params.h"
@@ -452,27 +451,15 @@ bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
   sandbox::InitLibcUrandomOverrides();
 #endif
 
-  int proc_fd_for_seccomp = -1;
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
-  if (SeccompSandboxEnabled()) {
-    // The seccomp sandbox needs access to files in /proc, which might be denied
-    // after one of the other sandboxes have been started. So, obtain a suitable
-    // file handle in advance.
-    proc_fd_for_seccomp = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
-    if (proc_fd_for_seccomp < 0) {
-      LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! Cannot access \"/proc\". Disabling seccomp "
-          "sandboxing.";
-    }
-  }
-#endif  // SECCOMP_SANDBOX
-
-  scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient>
-      setuid_sandbox(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient::Create());
+  LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox = LinuxSandbox::GetInstance();
+  // This will pre-initialize the various sandboxes that need it.
+  // There need to be a corresponding call to PreinitializeSandboxFinish()
+  // for each new process, this will be done in the Zygote child, once we know
+  // our process type.
+  linux_sandbox->PreinitializeSandbox();
 
-  if (setuid_sandbox == NULL) {
-    LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to instantiate the setuid sandbox client.";
-    return false;
-  }
+  sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
+      linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox();
 
   if (forkdelegate != NULL) {
     VLOG(1) << "ZygoteMain: initializing fork delegate";
@@ -486,7 +473,8 @@ bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
   // Turn on the SELinux or SUID sandbox.
   bool using_suid_sandbox = false;
   bool has_started_new_init = false;
-  if (!EnterSandbox(setuid_sandbox.get(),
+
+  if (!EnterSandbox(setuid_sandbox,
                     &using_suid_sandbox,
                     &has_started_new_init)) {
     LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enter sandbox. Fail safe abort. (errno: "
@@ -494,44 +482,15 @@ bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
     return false;
   }
 
-  int sandbox_flags = 0;
-  if (using_suid_sandbox) {
-    sandbox_flags |= kSandboxLinuxSUID;
-    if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewPIDNamespace())
-      sandbox_flags |= kSandboxLinuxPIDNS;
-    if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewNETNamespace())
-      sandbox_flags |= kSandboxLinuxNetNS;
-  }
-
-  if ((sandbox_flags & kSandboxLinuxPIDNS) && !has_started_new_init) {
+  if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewNETNamespace() && !has_started_new_init) {

[Jorge Lucangeli Obes, 2012/08/01 22:37:50]

PID namespace?

[jln (very slow on Chromium), 2012/08/01 22:48:11]

Good catch, thanks!

     LOG(ERROR) << "The SUID sandbox created a new PID namespace but Zygote "
                   "is not the init process. Please, make sure the SUID "
                   "binary is up to date.";
   }
 
-#if defined(SECCOMP_SANDBOX)
-  // The seccomp sandbox will be turned on when the renderers start. But we can
-  // already check if sufficient support is available so that we only need to
-  // print one error message for the entire browser session.
-  if (proc_fd_for_seccomp >= 0 && SeccompSandboxEnabled()) {
-    if (!SupportsSeccompSandbox(proc_fd_for_seccomp)) {
-      // There are a good number of users who cannot use the seccomp sandbox
-      // (e.g. because their distribution does not enable seccomp mode by
-      // default). While we would prefer to deny execution in this case, it
-      // seems more realistic to continue in degraded mode.
-      LOG(ERROR) << "WARNING! This machine lacks support needed for the "
-                    "Seccomp sandbox. Running renderers with Seccomp "
-                    "sandboxing disabled.";
-      close(proc_fd_for_seccomp);
-      proc_fd_for_seccomp = -1;
-    } else {
-      VLOG(1) << "Enabling experimental Seccomp sandbox.";
-      sandbox_flags |= kSandboxLinuxSeccomp;
-    }
-  }
-#endif  // SECCOMP_SANDBOX
+  int sandbox_flags = linux_sandbox->GetStatus();
 
-  Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags, forkdelegate, proc_fd_for_seccomp);
+  Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags, forkdelegate);
   // This function call can return multiple times, once per fork().
   return zygote.ProcessRequests();
 }