Linux sandbox: cleanup sandbox-bpf naming.

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__
 #define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <limits>
 #include <map>
 #include <set>
 #include <utility>
 #include <vector>
 
 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/die.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/errorcode.h"
 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h"
 
-namespace playground2 {
+namespace sandbox {
 
 struct arch_seccomp_data {
   int nr;
   uint32_t arch;
   uint64_t instruction_pointer;
   uint64_t args[6];
 };
 
 struct arch_sigsys {
   void* ip;
   int nr;
   unsigned int arch;
 };
 
 class CodeGen;
 class SandboxUnittestHelper;
 class SandboxBpfPolicy;
 struct Instruction;
 
-class Sandbox {
+class SandboxBPF {

[Robert Sesek, 2013/12/10 15:07:46]

So we have SandboxBPF and SandboxBpfPolicy. We should pick one naming
convention. I prefer the studly caps of BPF, so maybe SandboxBpfPolicy needs to
be SandboxBPFPolicy, or the other way and this becomes SandboxBpf.

[jln (very slow on Chromium), 2013/12/10 18:43:47]

I've been through the whole codebase and capitalized everything.

  public:
   enum SandboxStatus {
     STATUS_UNKNOWN,      // Status prior to calling supportsSeccompSandbox()
     STATUS_UNSUPPORTED,  // The kernel does not appear to support sandboxing
     STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,  // Currently unavailable but might work again later
     STATUS_AVAILABLE,    // Sandboxing is available but not currently active
     STATUS_ENABLED       // The sandbox is now active
   };
 
   // When calling setSandboxPolicy(), the caller can provide an arbitrary
   // pointer in |aux|. This pointer will then be forwarded to the sandbox
   // policy each time a call is made through an EvaluateSyscall function
   // pointer.  One common use case would be to pass the "aux" pointer as an
   // argument to Trap() functions.
-  typedef ErrorCode (*EvaluateSyscall)(Sandbox* sandbox_compiler,
+  typedef ErrorCode (*EvaluateSyscall)(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
                                        int system_call_number,
                                        void* aux);
   typedef std::vector<std::pair<EvaluateSyscall, void*> > Evaluators;
   // A vector of BPF instructions that need to be installed as a filter
   // program in the kernel.
   typedef std::vector<struct sock_filter> Program;
 
   // Constructors and destructors.
   // NOTE: Setting a policy and starting the sandbox is a one-way operation.
   //       The kernel does not provide any option for unloading a loaded
   //       sandbox. Strictly speaking, that means we should disallow calling
   //       the destructor, if StartSandbox() has ever been called. In practice,
   //       this makes it needlessly complicated to operate on "Sandbox"
   //       objects. So, we instead opted to allow object destruction. But it
   //       should be noted that during its lifetime, the object probably made
   //       irreversible state changes to the runtime environment. These changes
   //       stay in effect even after the destructor has been run.
-  Sandbox();
-  ~Sandbox();
+  SandboxBPF();
+  ~SandboxBPF();
 
   // Checks whether a particular system call number is valid on the current
   // architecture. E.g. on ARM there's a non-contiguous range of private
   // system calls.
   static bool IsValidSyscallNumber(int sysnum);
 
   // There are a lot of reasons why the Seccomp sandbox might not be available.
   // This could be because the kernel does not support Seccomp mode, or it
   // could be because another sandbox is already active.
   // "proc_fd" should be a file descriptor for "/proc", or -1 if not
@@ skipping 172 matching lines @@
   Instruction* CondExpression(CodeGen* gen, const ErrorCode& cond);
 
   static SandboxStatus status_;
 
   bool quiet_;
   int proc_fd_;
   scoped_ptr<const SandboxBpfPolicy> policy_;
   Conds* conds_;
   bool sandbox_has_started_;
 
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Sandbox);
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SandboxBPF);
 };
 
 }  // namespace
 
 #endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX_BPF_H__